Hélène Mulholland with live coverage from the Chilcot inquiry as Lord Prescott gives evidence10.37am: Here's a summary of Prescott's evidence so far:He told the inquiry he was determined to get a UN resolution before the invasion of Iraq. "I was a strong advocate, as was the prime minister, that we must secure a UN resolution" (see 10.08am).He said it was clear that some in the US administration were determined to invade Iraq come what may. He told the inquiry Blair told him the US was quite prepared to "go without us".Prescott said he was satisfied that the 2003 invasion of Iraq was legal. He pointed out that parliament had the opportunity to vote on the invasion.Blair warned Prescott not to be offended by the language during a video link between the then PM and the then US president, George Bush. Chilcot also asked Prescott to slow down when he was giving evidence, as the panel were having trouble keeping up.10.35am: Prescott is asked about Jack Straw telling the inquiry that the UN security council was "close to consensus" and suggesting the failure to reach agreement was just down the French.Prescott says that it isn't right, but goes on to suggest other countries might have been swayed by the French position. Also, Straw would have known more about the level of entrenchment on this issue by different nations, he says. He accepts that was Straw's judgement and he can't dispute it.They've just taken a ten-minute comfort break.10.30am: Prescott is asked whether what would be done if a second resolution was achieved had been thought through. He points to the fact that military preparations started some months before the invasion. The cabinet asked whether it would be legal to invade without a second resolution. Lord Goldsmith said yes.Claire Short told the inquiry that she, Brown and Blair were in a meeting together where they decided to "blame the French" for the failed attempt to get a second resolution. Prescott says the French weren't supporting it, so it was fair to say it. It wasn't just the French who didn't support it, says Lyne. "You're right," says Prescott, but goes on to add that the French "easily come to mind" when blame needs to be dished out. He cites our geographical closeness, but also historical reasons, for why it felt OK to centre attention on Jacques Chirac.10.28am: Prescott is asked about UN resolution 1441. He says that, under the UN, there was the possibility of regime change – just not achieved in the way the US was intending.Asked about the push for a second resolution in the early part of 2003, Prescott says it was critical to get an agreement on that – but it became increasingly clear agreement was not going to be reached.10.20am: The inquiry is asking about the link between talks on Iraq and commitments on the Middle East peace process. Prescott makes clear his belief that Blair was committed to the process. He also suggests that Bush was making the right noises. It faltered, but he doesn't see that as Blair's failure.He concurs with David Cameron that, ultimately, Britain was the "junior partner" and the US would have invaded Iraq with or without UK backing.10.14am: Prescott is asked about conversations between ministers in Britain and their counterparts in the US. Talking about his discussions with the then vice president, Dick Cheney, he mutters: "You can't convince him of anything". Cheney certainly wasn't in favour of the UN role, and saw Iraq as unfinished business. The only man who appeared to have changed his mind was Bush, who agreed to go down the UN route.10.08am: Prashar asks whether Blair had told Prescott about the level of commitment he had given Bush. Prescott says Blair did not tell him he had promised that he would stand with him. He says it was up to the PM to decide Britain's relationship with the US. Prescott seems clear that Blair was intent on the UN route. Bush said he was going to go through the UN. But he says Blair told him the US was quite prepared to "go without us".Blair went back to the cabinet, and to parliament – so even if he had made a commitment to Bush, the final decision was a political one and that meant the vote in parliament, he says.10.07am: Prescott recalls watching a video link of talks between Bush and Blair. He says Blair warned him not to be offended by the language, and it wasn't swearing he was talking about. Prescott hints that he was suitably shocked. He doesn't remember when this happened.10.06am: Prescott says he found it difficult to listen to US colleagues talking about Iraq as "unfinished business". I think he's referring to 2002. He says he realised the US was set on upon regime change while Britain was committed to the UN route, and told Blair so. And (not for the first time) Prescott has been asked to slow down a bit – he naturally speaks very quickly indeed!10.02am: Was Prescott being shown a link between WMD and the threat of terrorism from Iraq?Lyne raises evidence given earlier this month by former MI5 head Eliza Manningham-Buller, who said the terrorist threat was coming from elsewhere. Prescott says it was accepted that terrorism was linked to WMD. It was one of the given facts that was accepted, he adds, but says he now wonders whether he should have made that assumption.9.57am: Prescott talks about Robin Cook, who resigned as the leader of the Commons over Iraq in March 2003. He says Blair asked him to persuade Cook not to resign, which he tried to do. Cook did not believe there were WMD in Iraq. Prescott says he tried to relay the arguments in favour of the route Britain was taking – but Cook turned out to be right.9.54am: On the 45 minute claim, Prescott says he assumed its inclusion meant there must be something in it but that he was a bit "nervous" about the conclusions that this could lead to.The impression was that there might be a nuclear element to the WMD alleged to be hidden in Iraq, he says.When giving evidence to the inquiry, Blair said he regretted not correcting the impression given by the 45-claim (such as the "Brits 45 mins from doom" headline suggesting Iraqi missiles could hit British troops in Cyprus). Prescott said he "took the evidence" and hoped matters would be settled through the UN.9.50am: Lyne cites Blair's admission that there were a lot of ad hoc discussions at which strategy was formed. Most of these were not minuted. Was Prescott part of the decision making process? Prescott says he was on the sofa all the time – a reference to Blair's "sofa" style of government. He says Blair consulted key ministers, as Margaret Thatcher did before him. He wasn't in every discussion, but he was kept abreast of developments.Prescott says he was a bit worried that military options were being worked out when there was still a feeling that the route should be through the UN. The Americans were very clear that they wanted support from the UK, he says. Prior to the April 2002 Crawford meeting between Bush and Blair, there were early stage papers being produced that he didn't necessarily see, but was aware they were being circulated. His recollection is the same as Gordon Brown's – Brown told the inquiry he was "regularly kept in touch" about what was happening but didn't see the options papers drawn up before Crawford either.9.45am: Lyne takes Prescott back to the first half of 2002. Was he part of discussions about whether the Britain should take part in military action then? Prescott says he was, in various committee meetings that took place. He says he, like Blair, was a strong advocate of the UN resolution route. The stance from Britain at the time was that intervention should be through international consensus and the UN.9.41am: Lyne tells Prescott that his role as deputy prime minister gave him a lot of influence in cabinet, and asked about the fact that many discussions about Iraq were ad hoc, outside the confines of cabinet meetings and unminuted.Prescott says there was a difference between large ad hoc meetings and smaller ones. He tells the panel he attended more meetings in the process of leading up to the war then afterwards. He felt he received enough information, through private and public meetings as well as cabinet meetings, to have his say.He raises the issue of confidentiality in meetings because of fears of leaks. Claire Short, the international development secretary at the time of the war, told the inquiry Blair said he did not want Iraq discussed in cabinet because he did not want the fact that it was being discussed to be leaked.9.37am: Prescott explains, as Blair himself did when giving evidence, that the then prime minister watched coverage of the September 11 attacks – and his views about the terrorism threat changed.9.36am: Prescott begins by offering his sympathies to families who have lost loved ones in Iraq. He explains his role in supporting Blair, and gives a long list of duties he undertook, including chairing nine cabinet committees. He says he attended 23 at least 24 war cabinet meetings and chaired several when Blair wasn't around to do so.9.35am: It might help to remind readers of the full inquiry panel, which is: Sir John Chilcot (chairman), Sir Lawrence Freedman, Sir Martin Gilbert, Sir Roderic Lyne and Baroness Usha Prashar9.25am: The recently ennobled former deputy prime minister Lord Prescott is about to give evidence to the Chilcot inquiry. Prescott, the deputy prime minister throughout Tony Blair's years in power, reflected last year on why he "went along" with the Iraq war.In an interview with the New Statesman in December, he said:"I do wonder, looking back now, having the privilege of discussing with Tony [Blair] about all this: how did I then go along [with it]?"Prescott recalled witnessing "hair-raising" conversations about Iraq between Blair and George Bush. He has a relatively short slot – just one and a half hours – to explain what he heard, understood and believed in the run up to the invasion of Iraq and in its aftermath.

• John Prescott
• Iraq war inquiry

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